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Deep learning has become the state of the art approach in many machine learning problems such
as classication. It has recently been shown that deep learning is highly vulnerable to adversarial
perturbations. Taking the camera systems of self-driving cars as an example, small adversarial
perturbations can cause the system to make errors in important tasks, such as classifying trac
signs or detecting pedestrians. Hence, in order to use deep learning without safety concerns a
proper defense strategy is required. We propose to use ensemble methods as a defense strategy
against adversarial perturbations. We nd that an aack leading one model to misclassify does not
imply the same for other networks performing the same task. is makes ensemble methods an
aractive defense strategy against adversarial aacks. We empirically show for the MNIST and the
CIFAR-10 data sets that ensemble methods not only improve the accuracy of neural networks on
test data but also increase their robustness against adversarial perturbations.
1 Introduction
In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) led to signicant improvements in many areas ranging from
computer vision (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; LeCun et al., 2015) to speech recognition (Hinton et al., 2012; Dahl et al.,
2012). Some applications that can be solved with DNNs are sensitive from the security perspective, for example
camera systems of self driving cars for detecting trac signs or pedestrians (Papernot et al., 2016b; Sermanet &
LeCun, 2011). Recently, it has been shown that DNNs can be highly vulnerable to adversaries (Szegedy et al.,
2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Papernot et al., 2016a,b). e adversary produces some kind of noise on the input
of the system to mislead its output behavior, producing undesirable outcomes or misclassication. Adversarial
perturbations are carefully chosen in order to be hard, if not impossible, to be detected by the human eye (see
gure 1). Aacks occur aer the training of the DNN is completed. Furthermore, it has been shown that the
exact structure of the DNN does not need to be known in order to mislead the system as one can send inputs
to the unknown system in order to record its outputs to train a new DNN that imitates its behavior (Papernot
et al., 2016b). Hence, in this manuscript it is assumed that the DNN and all its parameters are fully known to the
adversary.
ere are many methods on how to aack neural networks appearing in the literature. Some of the most
well-known ones are the Fast Gradient Sign Method (Goodfellow et al., 2014) and its iterative extension (Kurakin
et al., 2016), DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), Jacobian-Based Saliency Map Aack (Papernot et al.,
2016c), C&W aack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017), and the L-BFGS Aack (Szegedy et al., 2013). is shows the need
of building neural networks that are themselves robust against any kind of adversarial perturbations.
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Figure 1: e rst line shows original and correctly classied MNIST test data images. In the second line are
the corresponding adversarial BIM aacks on a single classier ( = 0.2, α = 0.025, n = 8) which
predicts (from le to right): 6, 8, 1, 5, 9, 3, 0, 2, 2, and 4. Analogously, the third line corresponds to
correctly predicted examples of the CIFAR-10 test data set. In the boom line are the corresponding
adversarial BIM aacks on a single classier ( = 0.02, α = 0.0025, n = 8) which predicts (from le
to right): deer, cat, deer, ship, bird, deer, deer, frog, automobile, and automobile.
Novel methods on defending against adversarial aacks are appearing more and more frequently in the
literature. Some of those defense methods are to train the network with dierent kinds of adversarially
perturbated training data (Goodfellow et al., 2014), the use of distillation to reduce the eectiveness of the
perturbation (Papernot et al., 2016d) or to apply denoising autoencoders to preprocess the data used by the
DNN (Gu & Rigazio, 2014). It also has been noted that adversarial aacks can be detected (Metzen et al., 2017;
Feinman et al., 2017), but these detection systems are again vulnerable to adversarial aacks. To our knowledge,
there is no method that can reliably defend or detect all kinds of adversarial aacks.
In this manuscript, ensemble methods are used to obtain a classication system that is more robust against
adversarial perturbations. e term ensemble method refers to constructing a set of classiers used to classify
new data points by the weighted or unweighted average of their predictions. Many ensemble methods have
been introduced in the literature such as Bayesian averaging, Bagging (Breiman, 1996) and boosting (Dieerich
et al., 2000). ese methods frequently win machine learning competitions, for example the Netix prize (Koren,
2009).
Recently, the idea of improving particular defense methods with ensembles emerged in the literature. In
(Abbasi & Gagne´, 2017) a special kind of ensembles of specialist networks was proposed, but it turned out that
this method could be fooled (He et al., 2017). Later, it was proposed to improve adversarial training by using
ensembles of adversarial trained networks (Trame`r et al., 2017). However, this method reduces the accuracy on
unperturbed test data. is problem arises in most, if not all, relatively successful defense mechanisms against
adversarial perturbations (see Table 4). With this in mind, most defense methods might not be practical for real
life applications where state of the art accuracies are required on unperturbed test data.
is is the rst paper that considers ensemble methods as sole defense. is comes with the advantage
that they improve the accuracy on unperturbed test data while increasing the robustness against adversarial
perturbations considerably. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only defense method with these properties.
e advantages come at the cost of an increase of computational complexity and memory requirements.
is paper is organized as follows: In section 2, some methods for producing adversarial perturbations are
briey introduced. Section 3 describes the defense strategy proposed in this manuscript. In section 4, the
previous methods are tested on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets and are compared to other defense strategies
appearing in the literature. Finally, in section 5 the conclusions are presented.
2
2 Adversarial Aack
In this section, two methods for producing adversarial aacks shall be briey described. In the following, let θ
be the parameters of a model, x the input of the model and y the output value associated with the input value x.
Further, let J(θ, x, y) be the cost function used to train the DNN.
2.1 Fast Gradient Sign Method
e fast gradient sign method (FGSM) by Goodfellow et al. (2014) simply adds some small perturbations of size
 > 0 to the input x,
xFGSM = x+  sign[∇xJ(θ, x, y)] ,
where the gradient ∇xJ(θ, x, y) can be computed using backpropagation. is relatively cheap and simple
adversarial perturbation performs well on many DNNs. It is believed that this behavior is due to linear elements
such as ReLUs or maxout networks in the DNNs (Goodfellow et al., 2014).
2.2 Basic Iterative Method
e basic iterative method (BIM) by Kurakin et al. (2016) is an iterative extension of FGSM. e idea is to choose
 ≥ α > 0 and then apply some perturbations similar to FGSM to the input x and repeat the process n times:
x0 = x,
xi = clipx,
(
xi−1 + α sign[∇xi−1J(θ, xi−1, y)]
)
,
xBIM = xn.
Here, clipx,(·) refers to clipping the values of the adversarial sample so that they remain within an -neighborhood
of x.
3 Ensemble Methods
Ensemble methods are widely used to improve classiers in supervised learning (Dieerich et al., 2000). e
idea is to construct a set of classiers that is used to classify a new data point by the weighted or unweighted
average of their predictions. In order for an ensemble to outperform a single classier it must be both accurate
and diverse (Hansen & Salamon, 1990). A classier is said to be accurate if it is beer than random guessing,
and a set of classiers is said to be diverse if dierent classiers make dierent errors on new data points.
As expected, when performing adversarial perturbations on new data points dierent classiers perform quite
dierently on these points. Hence, we conclude that diversity on adversarial perturbations is given. Furthermore,
for adversarial perturbations with small  > 0, the vast majority of classiers was accurate. In other words,
for any small  > 0, we could not nd an adversarial aack that would turn the majority of classiers into
non-accurate classiers.
In section 4, the following ensemble methods are used. Note that random initialization of the model parameters
is used in all methods.
(i) e rst method is to train multiple classiers with the same network architecture but with random initial
weights. is results in quite diverse classiers with dierent nal weights (Kolen & Pollack, 1991).
(ii) e second method is to train multiple classiers with dierent but similar network architectures to ensure
obtaining a set of even more diverse classiers. at is, extra lters are used in one classier or an extra
convolution layer is added to another classier.
(iii) ird, Bagging (Breiman, 1996) is used on the training data. e term Bagging is derived from bootstrap
aggregation and it consists of drawing m samples with replacement from the training data set of m data
points. Each of these new data sets is called a bootstrap replicate. At average each of them contains 63.2%
of the training data, where many data points are repeated in the bootstrap replicates. A dierent bootstrap
replicate is used as training data for each classier in the ensemble.
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Table 1: MNIST Network Architecture
Layer Type Parameters
Relu Convolutional 32 lters (3×3)
Relu Convolutional 32 lters (3×3)
Max Pooling 2×2
Relu Fully Connected 128 units
Dropout 0.5
Relu Fully Connected 10 units
Somax 10 units
(iv) e last method is to add some small Gaussian noise to the training data so that all classiers are trained
on similar but dierent training sets. Note that adding Gaussian noise to the training data also makes each
classier somewhat more robust against adversarial perturbations.
Once an ensemble of classiers is trained, it predicts by leing each classier vote for a label. More specically,
the predicted value is chosen to be the label that maximizes the average of the output probabilities from the
classiers in the ensemble.
In order to aack a network with the methods from section 2 the gradient∇xJ(θ, x, y) must be computed. To
evaluate the robustness of the proposed ensemble methods, two dierent gradients are used. ey are referred
to as Grad. 1 and Grad. 2:
Grad. 1 Use∇xJ(θi, x, y) of the i-th classier. is is clearly not the correct gradient for an ensemble. But the
question is whether an aack with this gradient can already mislead all classiers in the ensemble in a
similar manner.
Grad. 2 Compute the average of the gradients 1n
∑
i∇xJ(θi, x, y) from all classiers in the ensemble.
A comparison of the eects of these two gradients for aacking ensembles can be found in section 4.
4 Experiments
In this section the ensemble methods from section 3 are empirically evaluated on the MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998)
and the CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009) data sets which are scaled to the unit interval. All experiments
have been performed on ensembles of 10 classiers. Note that this choice has been done for comparability. at
is, in some cases the best performance was already reached with ensembles of less classiers while in others
more classiers might improve the results.
A summary of the experimental results can be found in Table 2 and the corresponding visualization in Figure
2. A comparison of ensembles with other defense methods and a combination of those with ensembles can be
found in Table 4. In the following all FGSM perturbations are done with  = 0.3 on MNIST and with  = 0.03
on CIFAR-10. Furthermore, all BIM perturbations are done with  = 0.2, α = 0.025 and n = 8 iterations on
MNIST and with  = 0.02, α = 0.0025 and n = 8 on CIFAR-10. e abbreviations in Table 2 and in Figure 2
shall be interpreted in the following way: Rand. Ini. refers to random initialization of the weights of the neural
network, Mix. Mod. means that the network architecture was slightly dierent for each classier in an ensemble,
Bagging refers to classiers trained on bootstrap replicates of the training data, and Gauss noise implies that
small Gaussian noise has been added to the training data. Each ensemble is aacked with FGSM and BIM based
on the gradients from Grad. 1 and Grad. 2. In Table 2, the term Single refers to evaluating a single classier.
4.1 MNIST
e MNIST data set consists of 60,000 training and 10,000 test data samples of black and white encoded
handwrien digits. e objective is to classify these digits in the range from 0 to 9. A selection of images from
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Table 2: Experimental results on the MNIST and the CIFAR-10 data sets
MNIST Accuracy
Test Data No Aack Grad. 1 Grad. 2
Type Method Single Ensemble Single Ensemble Ensemble
FGSM
Rand. Ini. 0.9912 0.9942 0.3791 0.6100 0.4517
Mix. Mod. 0.9918 0.9942 0.3522 0.5681 0.4609
Bagging 0.9900 0.9927 0.4045 0.6738 0.5716
Gauss Noise 0.9898 0.9920 0.5587 0.7816 0.7043
BIM
Rand. Ini. 0.9912 0.9942 0.0906 0.6518 0.8875
Mix. Mod. 0.9918 0.9942 0.0582 0.6656 0.9076
Bagging 0.9900 0.9927 0.1110 0.7068 0.9233
Gauss Noise 0.9898 0.9920 0.5429 0.9152 0.9768
CIFAR-10 Accuracy
Test Data No Aack Grad. 1 Grad. 2
Type Method Single Ensemble Single Ensemble Ensemble
FGSM
Rand. Ini. 0.7984 0.8448 0.1778 0.4538 0.3302
Mix. Mod. 0.7898 0.8400 0.1643 0.4339 0.3140
Bagging 0.7815 0.8415 0.1822 0.4788 0.3571
Gauss Noise 0.7160 0.7687 0.2966 0.6097 0.4707
BIM
Rand. Ini. 0.7984 0.8448 0.1192 0.5232 0.6826
Mix. Mod. 0.7898 0.8400 0.1139 0.5259 0.6768
Bagging 0.7815 0.8415 0.1280 0.5615 0.7166
Gauss Noise 0.7160 0.7687 0.3076 0.6735 0.7277
the data set and some adversarial perturbations can be found in the top two rows of gure 1. In the experiments,
the network architecture in Table 1 is used and it is trained with 10 epochs. All results from the experiments are
summarized in Table 2.
On unperturbed test data the classication accuracy is roughly 99%. e dierence between single classiers
and ensembles is below one percent throughout. e ensembles slightly outperform the single classiers in all
cases.
is picture changes dramatically if the networks are aacked by one of the methods described in section 2.
Using the FGSM aack with gradients from Grad. 1 on a single classier, the classication rate drops down to a
range of roughly 35%–56%. e ensembles perform signicantly beer by producing an accuracy of 57%–78%.
Evaluating the same with gradients from Grad. 2 it turns out that ensemble methods still obtain an accuracy
of 45%–70%. e higher accuracy of Grad. 1 is expected since in contrast to Grad. 2 it computes the gradients
with respect to just one classier. Nevertheless, the ensembles outperform single classiers in each case by
approximately 7%-22%.
e decrease of the accuracy is even more extreme for single classiers if the BIM method is used. Here, the
accuracy can be as low as around 6% and only the classiers trained with Gaussian noise signicantly exceed the
10%. e accuracy of the ensemble methods against aacks using Grad. 1 is considerably higher with 65%–92%.
Furthermore, ensembles are even more robust against BIM aacks based on Grad. 2 with a correct classication
rate of 89%–98%. It is surprising that BIM aacks using Grad. 1 are more successful than those using Grad. 2,
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Figure 2: Visual comparisons of the accuracies presented in Table 2. Compared are the MNIST (top row) and
CIFAR-10 (boom row) data sets on the FGSM (le column) and the BIM (right column) aacks. Grad. 1
Single refers to aacks based on Grad. 1 on single classiers, Grad. 1 Ensemble refers to aacks based
on Grad. 1 on ensembles, Grad. 2 Ensemble refers to aacks based on Grad. 2 on ensemble classiers,
No Aack Single refers to single classier on unperturbed data, and nally No Aack Ensemble refers
to ensemble classiers on unperturbed data.
because Grad. 1 only aacks a single classier in the ensemble. Concluding, the ensemble methods outperform
single classiers signicantly by 37%-85% on BIM aacks.
Focusing on the dierent defense strategies, we observe that using random initialization of the network
weights as well as using several networks of similar architectures for an ensemble generally improves the
robustness against adversarial aacks considerably in comparison with single classiers. Bagging outperforms
both of the previous methods on adversarial perturbations, but performs slightly worse on unperturbed test
data. Using ensembles with small Gaussian noise on the training data results in the best defense mechanism
against adversarial aacks. is may be due to the fact that using additive noise on the training data already
makes every single classier in the ensemble more robust against adversarial perturbations. On the down-side,
adding Gaussian noise to the training data performs worst from all considered ensemble methods on test data.
However, such an ensemble still performs beer than all single classiers on MNIST.
4.2 CIFAR-10
e CIFAR-10 data set consists of 50,000 training and 10,000 test data samples of three-color component encoded
images of ten mutually exclusive classes: airplane, automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship, and truck. A
selection of images from the data set and some adversarial perturbations can be found in the two boom rows of
gure 1. In all experiments the network architecture described in Table 3 is used and the networks are trained
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Table 3: CIFAR-10 Network Architecture
Layer Type Parameters
Relu Convolutional 32 lters (3×3)
Relu Convolutional 32 lters (3×3)
Max Pooling 2×2
Dropout 0.2
Relu Convolutional 64 lters (3×3)
Relu Convolutional 64 lters (3×3)
Max Pooling 2×2
Dropout 0.3
Relu Convolutional 128 lters (3×3)
Relu Convolutional 128 lters (3×3)
Max Pooling 2×2
Dropout 0.4
Relu Fully Connected 512 units
Dropout 0.5
Relu Fully Connected 10 units
Somax 10 units
with 25 epochs.
In general, the observations on the MNIST data set are conrmed by the experiments on CIFAR-10. Since the
laer data set is more demanding to classify, the overall classication rate is already lower in the aack-free
case, where single classiers reach an accuracy of roughly 72%–80%, while ensembles show a higher accuracy of
77%–84%. Note that there are network architectures in the literature that outperform our classiers considerably
on test data (Graham, 2014).
e FGSM aacks on single classiers using method Grad. 1 show a drop-down of the accuracy to 16%-30%.
In contrast, ensembles are signicantly beer reaching accuracies of 43%-61% when aacked using Grad. 1 and
31%-47% when aacked with Grad. 2.
When using BIM aacks accuracies for single classiers lie between 11% and 31%. Again, the ensemble
methods outperform the single classiers reaching accuracies of 52%-67% when aacked using Grad. 1 and
68%-73% when aacked with Grad. 2.
e same observations as on the MNIST data set can be made on the CIFAR-10 data set. All ensemble methods
outperform single classiers when comparing their robustness against adversarial perturbations. FGSM aacks
on an ensemble using Grad. 2 outperform those using Grad. 1, as expected. Similar to the MNIST experiments,
when using BIM aacks, ensembles are surprisingly more robust against gradient aacks from Grad. 2 than
against gradient aacks from Grad. 1. e reason for this might be that the gradient portion from dierent
classiers using Grad. 2 in the ensemble try to reach a dierent local maximum and block each other in the
following iterations.
As already observed on the MNIST data set, Bagging performs beer than random initialization and than
using similar but dierent network architectures. Again, adding small Gaussian noise on the training data
performs best on adversarial perturbations but relatively poor on real test data on CIFAR-10.
4.3 Comparison with other Methods
In this section, we compare the previous results with two of the most popular defense methods: adversarial
training (Goodfellow et al., 2014) and defensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2016d). Furthermore, we show the
positive eects of combining those methods with ensembles. For simplicity, we only consider the gradient
Grad. 2 whenever an ensemble is aacked. e results are summarized in Table 4. Here, the content shall be
interpreted in the following way: Bagging refers to ensembles trained with bagging, Adv. Train. to adversarial
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Table 4: Accuracies of dierent defense mechanisms
MNIST CIFAR-10
Methods No Aack FGSM BIM No Aack FGSM BIM
Bagging 0.9927∗ 0.5716 0.9233 0.8415∗ 0.3571 0.7166∗
Adv. Train. 0.9902 0.3586 0.5420 0.7712 0.1778 0.3107
Def. Dist. 0.9840 0.0798 0.3829 0.7140 0.1828 0.3635
Bagging + Adv. Train. 0.9927∗ 0.8703∗ 0.9840∗ 0.8320 0.5010∗ 0.7017
Bagging + Def. Dist. 0.9875 0.0954 0.4514 0.7323 0.1839 0.4569
training, Def. Dist. to defensive distillation, the operator + to combinations of the previous methods, bold text
to the best performance of the rst three methods, and the asterisk to the best method including combinations
of defensive strategies.
Adversarial training (AT) is a method that uses FGSM as regularizer of the original cost function:
JAT (θ, x, y) = ρJ(θ, x, y) + (1− ρ)J(θ, x+  sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)), y),
where ρ ∈ [0, 1]. is method iteratively increases the robustness against adversarial perturbations. In our
experiments, we use ρ = 12 as proposed in Goodfellow et al. (2014).
In defensive distillation a teacher model F is trained on a training data set X . en smoothed labels at
temperature T are computed by
FT (X) =
[
exp(Fi(X)/T )∑N
i=1 exp(Fi(X)/T )
]
i∈{1,...,N}
,
where Fi(X) refers to the probability of the i-th out of N possible classes. A distilled network is a network that
is trained on the training data X using the smoothed labels FT (X). In the following, we use T = 10 based on
the experimental results in Papernot et al. (2016d).
We found that single networks trained with adversarial training or defensive distillation have a lower accuracy
than ensembles trained with bagging (see the top three rows in Table 4). is is not only the case on the
considered aacked data but also on unperturbed test data. Combining ensembles with adversarial training can
improve the robustness against adversarial perturbations further, while a combination with defensive distillation
does not reveal the same tendency (see the two boom rows in Table 4). We emphasize that already the standard
ensemble method does not only outperform both adversarial training and defensive distillation throughout but
also has the overall highest accuracy on unperturbed test data.
5 Conclusion
With the rise of deep learning as the state-of-the-art approach for many classication tasks, researchers noted
that neural networks are highly vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. is is particularly problematic when
neural networks are used in security sensitive applications such as autonomous driving. Hence, with the
development of more ecient aack methods against neural networks it is desirable to obtain neural networks
that are themselves robust against adversarial aacks while showing state of the art performance on unperturbed
data.
In this manuscript, it is shown that several ensemble methods such as random initialization or Bagging do
not only increase the accuracy on the test data, but also make the classiers considerably more robust against
certain adversarial aacks. We consider ensemble methods as sole defense methods, but more robust classiers
can be obtained by combining ensemble methods with other defense mechanisms such as adversarial training.
However, this typically leads to a decrease of accuracy on unperturbed data. Although only having tested simple
aack scenarios, it can be expected that ensemble methods may improve the robustness against other adversarial
aacks.
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